Logical Positivists Stance

The most basic logical positivism is presented in two processes. They are logical reasoning and the empirical experience wherein the first is gained through analytical and the second denote synthetic posteriori. Nevertheless, philosophical analysis has been categorised as an expression of art wherein, several facets are assembled with a lot of features of words and sentences with the concepts and the propositions. On the other hand, a successful analysis will emanate from a self-conscious philosophical progress in life. Sometimes while undertaking philosophical analysis, some observation of analysis is required to be considered for example, the source of philosophical knowledge, the linkage of language and the world, the importance of languages in an individual's mind, and the type of inferences. Truly, the concept of philosophical analysis is based with its prominence on "philosophical analysis" that is absolutely intelligible and identified on a conventional basis. (Carnap, 1969).

Moore in his book states that on the whole he considered that philosophers do not have any special knowledge which is earlier than and more secure compared to the ideal examples of what we understand pre theoretically. The impact of this stance was to wholly negate the kind of philosophy practiced by some of his teachers. In the opinion of Moore, the task of philosophy is never to prove or counter the most basic proposition we all accept by instinct. We are left with no alternatives but to agree to these propositions. However the core function of philosophy is elucidating how we came to know about them. He thought that the solution in doing such was examining accurately the postulates of the propositions, and therefore, what & when we come to know them. His also switches his analysis between two most important subjects' viz. perpetual knowledge and the ethics. Contextually he states that even though he gets success in his end result, the two subjects never satisfies his hopes and analysis. (Friedman, 1999).

Besides, Friedman goes on to describe that it seems to me that in Ethics, akin to other philosophical studies, the problems and incongruities which are in plenty are primarily because of a extremely plain cause: that is attempting questions, without in the first place ascertaining exactly what the question is which is required to be answered. I do not have any answer as to what extent the source of error would be avoided, if philosophers would attempt determining what questions they were asking, prior to getting ready to answer the same, since the task of analysis and distinction is sometimes very intricate: we might sometimes fall short of making the just needed discovery, although we whole-heartedly try in doing such. However, I am disposed to think that in several situations an unflinching endeavour would be enough to guarantee success; such that, if only this endeavour was done, bulk of the most obtrusive problems and incongruities in philosophy would vanish. A tall events, philosophers appear, on the whole, never to try, and, if as an outcome of this omission or not, they are always trying to prove that 'Yes' or 'No' will be able to give solutions, to which neither answer is right, because of the reality that what their minds are occupied with is never a single question, rather a lot of them, to some of which the genuine reply is 'No', to others 'Yes'. (p. vii).

She states in her opinion that exercise of analyses and distinction is extremely intricate and so proper methods must be undertaken to simplify the process and hence problems and disagreements in philosophy will wean. Under empiricism, formulation and principles have lend blurred characterizations to the fundamental view of the logical empiricism implying that the criteria to a massive extent preoccupied with an evaluation of philosophical and systematic formulations. (Friedman, 1999). In this case, it is stated that of late there has been a rising trepidation with positive task which was targeted at analyzing logic and processes of empirical science therefore building a best concept of empiricism appear to be the focus of the approach obtained. But in the opinion of Carnap who states that, "According to this self-styled standards of cognitive meaning, or of cognitive importance, a lot of formulations of conventional metaphysics and several portions of epistemology lack cognitive importance regardless of extent of richness of some of them in non-cognitive value by virtue of their emotional appeal or the moral encouragement they lend. (Carnap, 1969).

Metaphysics is derived from the attitudes of logical positivism. Carnap, in his article conveys the purging of metaphysics in a different viewpoint. In his context he mentions that, "A language- states Carnap- possesses a vocabulary- a collection of words having meaning joined through a syntax which is the rule dictating the built up of the sentences from the words of the vocabulary. Pseudo statements, which are a series of words which initially appear like statements but practically are devoid of any meaning. These are formed into two methods: either they contain words having no meaning, or they are created in a void manner without any syntax. In the opinion of Carnap, pseudo-statements of both types are happen in metaphysics. He goes on describing that a word W has an important meaning when exclusively two conditions are fulfilled. He gives an explanation that, "First of all, the manner of occurrence of W in its basic sentence form (viz. the simplest sentence form wherein W has chances of occurring) must be fixed. Next, if W happens in an elementary sentence S, it is imperative to hand out an answer to the following question which is in the opinion of Carnap - equal formulation of the identical question". But, in his discovery he states that several words of metaphysics nevertheless never satisfy metaphysics. The most important drawback of the logical positivism happens to be that scientific laws are by no means authentic and they cannot be verified. The rules devised to suggest predictions depend solely on predictions and the dependability of forecasts made. Besides, psychological concepts are never prohibited and therefore they are not replaced by physical concepts of trend languages. (Sarkar, 1996)


References

Carnap, Stephen. (1969) The Legacy of Logical Positivism: Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Friedman, Michael. (1999) Reconsidering Logical Positivism: Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Sarkar, Sahotra. (1996) The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: From 1900 to the Vienna Circle. New York: Garland Publishing.



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